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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The complaint in this case was filed by Young Electric 
Sign Company (here called 'Young') alleging Basil Vetas (here 
called 'Vetas') to be in default under a sign rental agreement 
and asking a money judgment. Vetas denied the allegations. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Trial was held May 11, 1976, before the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin, sitting without a jury. The District Court 
found Vetas in default, and entered judgment against him for 
$1,612.54. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Vetas asks this Court to reverse the lower court 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1961, Vetas signed with Young a "Rental Agreement" 
calling for installation of an electric sign at Vetas' drive-in 
establishment, 999 Washington Boulevard, Ogden. This agreement 
is a printed form used by Young. (Ex 8-D) • Vetas paid $660 
deposit, and agreed to pay $110 per month during the 96 month lease 
time. Young to maintain the sign (par. g); Vetas to pay all sales 
tax and electricity charges (par. e). 
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The sign was auly built and installed by Young in 1961, 
at a cost to it of $4,680.14 (R-119). Both parties performed 
fully under the agreement through January of 1963, when a new 
contract was executed, replacing the original (Ex 9-D). This 
contract left intact the original sign, but called for Young to 
install some lighted plexiglass panels on Vetas' building at the 
same location. The new "rental agreement" (Ex 9-D) called for 
96 monthly payments by Vetas of $135.00, with the other terms 
of the agreement identical to the 1961 contract. No work was 
performed on the original sign; the 1963 work installed by Young 
on the building was at a cost to it of $2,696.35 (R-120). 
Both parties again performed under the contract until 
the late fall of 1967. A new contract was then executed. Vetas 
needed the payments to be less than $100 per month, and after 
negotiation the new contract called for payment of $99.17 per mont 
for a new term of 96 months. (Ex 3-D). At the time the contract 
was executed Vetas was in arrears 4 payments, or $558.92 (Ex 1-D). 
No new work or construction of any nature was done at this time 
by Young (R-79) ; the new contract related solely to the then 
existing pole sign (installed in 1961) and panel lighting (instalU 
in 1963). 
The only dispute between the parties as to the execution 
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of the 1967 agreement relates to the $660 deposit. All agree 
it was still a deposit as of December 1967. Gilbert, manager 
of Young, testified the deposit was, in December of 1967, simply 
credited to Vetas' account (R-136). This was done he stated 
to compensate for an error of $1,200 he made in calculating 
the new contract price (R-85} • Vetas denied he had ever been 
informed by Young the deposit was being used or charged off 
(R-150}. Exhibit 3-D, the original white contract signed 
December 5, 1967 by both parties, and kept in the custody of 
Young, reflects the $660.00 deposit still being held by Young 
(par. 4) 
The Trial Court resolved this controversy agal~st Yo~ng 
(R-58) and allowed it as a credit to Vetas on sums found owing 
Young in 1973 and 1974. 
Vetas duly paid his installments under the new agreement 
until the winter of 1973-74. As of December l, 1973, Young 
claimed Vetas owed 6 payments, including December (Ex 6-P, R-112) 
A demand letter (Ex 4-D) was sent by Young to Vetas threatening to, 
among other things, disconnect his electricity and repossess the 
sign. Vetas paid another payment of $103.63 on December 26 (Ex 5-D, 
R-113) reducing the payments owed to 5 (R-127) or $587.54. 
Suit was filed by Young (R-2) alleging default in payments 
of $585.54 as of December 1, 1973, and asking liquidated damages 
-3-
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plus arrearage and atturney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING VETAS IN DEFAULT 
UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
It is not disputed that Vetas was in arrears through 
December of 1973, 5 payments at $99.17 per month, plus sales tax 
and interest, or $584.54. This is what Young alleged, and Vetas 
does not dispute the accuracy of the delinquent payments. Yet, 
Vetas was not in default because of three key facts: 
l) As of December, 1973, Vetas no longer had a $660.00 
deposit showing on Young's books. Gilbert, Young's manager, 
testified this had been taken off and applied in 1967 to compen-
sate for an error made in computing the 1967 contract (R-85, 136). 
Krantz, the bookkeeper for Young, said the $660.00 had been 
credited to Young as a set off against the miscalculation of the 
new contract (R-122). The money was never credited to Vetas' 
account (R-122) and was not used to pay past due installments in 
1967 or 1973 (R-124). No records were available to show what had 
actually happened to the $660.00, Young was not able to locate 
them for trial (R-121). 
2) Ex 1-D, the calculation sheet used by Young in fig-
uring the 1967 contract, shows the past due installments in No-
vember of 1967 ($558.92) being included in the new contract, in £a: 
-4-
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being more than included by reason of a monthly charge of $8.61 
for 96 months, representing the $558.92 plus 8 years' interest 
of $268.29. This confirms Vetas' deposit was never used to apply 
on back due installments. 
3) The Trial Court found (R-58) there was insufficient 
evidence for it to determine the disposition of the deposit, and 
therefore found Vetas was entitled to a credit of $660.00. 
It is well to note, in addition to the above, that no 
written documentation of the alleged use of the deposit was ever 
offered. Vetas denied ever being informed prior to suit the 
deposit had been set off or used (R-150) • 
What we are saying here is that Young had in fact appro-
priated Vetas $660.00, but improperly so! Therefore, since ~e 
was entitled to that credit in 1976, he surely was also entitled 
to it in 1973 when Young declared him in default and filed suit. 
The question is not the same as whether the tenant is entitled to 
have a security deposit off set on his demand against unpaid 
rentals. He may, or may not, and we do not ask this court to 
address itself to that issue. 
In our case, the deposit had in fact been appropriated 
by Young. It originally appeared in his account as a credit (R-122) 
but did not as of December 1973. The complaint (R-2) denies the 
-5-
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existence of such deposit. Vetas was entitled to that credit 
of $660.00 in December of 1973; his obligation was less than 
$600, he was not then in default. Nevertheless, Young declared 
him in default, refused to maintain the sign after January l, 1974, 
and filed this suit. Young was the party in default, for its 
admitted failure to maintain the sign after January l, 1974 (R-109). 
Since Young failed to perform when Vetas was not in default, it 
is not entitled to recover. See 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, ~425, 
Newsom v. Liberty Sign Co. Tex. 1967, 416 s.w. 2d 442. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGE PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT REASONABLE. 
The Trial Court found (R-58) the lease provision (par. B) 
with reference to liquidated damages reasonable. Upon such find-
ing, it gave Young judgment for 75% of the rentals from February, 
1974, through May, 1975. It did so even though it was undisputed 
Young performed absolutely no maintenance during the period, and 
repossessed the sign in February, 1975. 
The original cost of the sign and 1963 building panels 
was $7,376.00, (R-119, 120). During the period 1961 through 1973 
Vetas paid over $17,000.00 in rentals to Young (Ex 5-D) No 
improvements were made by Young during this period. 
In addition to recouping the cost of the installation 
over the term of the contract, Young had other items of expense, 
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namely, maintenance, insurance and taxes. In this case, using a 
percentage of original cost as a basis, Gilbert, Young's manager, 
testified that included in the monthly payment of $99.17 were 
the following: (R-90) 
Maintenance 
Taxes 
Insurance 
$50.00 
15.00 
15.00 
Maintenance cost records could not be found by Young. 
However, testimony was given by the credit manager (R-114) that 
1973 maintenance costs were $175.00. 
With regard to taxes, again no records could be found 
but Gilbert testified Young paid taxes on the signs of $3.75 per 
month (R-135). 
The third element, insurance, is in a state of doubt. 
Gilbert testified Young was self insured (R-90) Krantz testified 
Young was self insured on property damage (R-116) and had blanket 
coverage on liability. No evidence was offered as to the expense 
of this coverage to Young. 
In December, 1973, Young declared the contract in default 
and terminated maintenance and service (Ex 4-D, R-91, 109). Since 
the sign had no value to Young (Ex 3-D, par. 8; R-78) insurance 
would immeidately be reduced to the extent it was self insured. 
The cost of the liability insurance, which is unknown but could 
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not be great, would continue until it was junked. The taxes, 
assessed in January, would continue through the year 1974. Main-
tenance, of course, ceased to be any factor. 
By December of 1973, Vetas had already paid 12 years 
on the original sign, and 10 years on the 1963 additions. All 
payments were made under 8 year or 96 month leases, and certainly 
by then Young had long since recouped the original cost of the 
installations. Nevertheless, Vetas has to pay $1,188.00 to Young, 
representing the liquidated damages of 75% of the months from 
February of 1974 to May, 1975 at $99.17 per month. 
Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Section 339 provides: 
"§ 339. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTIES. 
(1) An agreement, made in advance of 
breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not 
enforceable as a contract and does not affect 
the damages recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable 
forecast of just compensation for the 
harm that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach 
is one that is incapable or very diffi-
cult of accurate estimation. 
This principle is generally recognized as controlling in 
these neon sign and other rental cases, see Ray v. Electrical 
Products, Wyo. 1964, 390 P2 607; Electrical Products Consolidated 
v. Sweet, lOth C.C.A. 1936, 83 F2 6. The lessor is entitled to 
recover only its actual damage for breach of contract in such 
cases, ~. supra. 
-8-
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We submit both requirements of §339 are violated here. 
First, the 75% figure does not reasonably relate to the real 
damage, and second, Young has years of experience, and could 
accurately figure those damages in advance. 
We note of the $99.00 payment, $50.00 per month was 
allocated to maintenance, $15.00 to taxes and $15.00 to insurance, 
a total of $80.00. As previously set out, the tax figure was 
actually $3.75 per month. The self insurance or damage would 
terminate since Young's position is the sign was valueless. 
The maintenance figure terminated also, as of January 1, 1974. 
Therefore, under the evidence Young's costs during the 
16 months it was awarded 75% of rentals were only $3.75 per month. 
Even assuming it was entitled to the other $19.17 ($99.l7 - $80.00) 
per month as finishing payment on the original sign (which we dis-
pute) nevertheless Young was awarded about $75.00 per month for 
16 months when its actual cost was $3.75, or at most $22.94 
($19.17 + $3.71). It is fine to say Young is entitled to the 
benefit of its bargain; and some cases (see Young Electric Sign Co. 
v. Capps, Idaho 1971, 492 P2 57) have held 75% of unpaid rentals 
is reasonable. Each case must stand on its own proof, and Young 
Electric calculated, in negotiating the contract, maintenance at 
$50.00, taxes at $15.00 and insurance at $15.00. 
Using these figures, the ones the parties contracted 
-9-
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with reference to, Yow1g after January 1, 1974 eliminates insurance, I 
'reason- I 
able forecast of actual damage' and Young is not entitled to the 
maintenance, and $11.25 of taxes. We submit there was no 
penalty imposed on Vetas for liquidated damages. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit Young, not Vetas, was in default under this 
contract when suit was filed. We further submit the damages 
awarded of $1,188.00 were a penalty and should be stricken from 
the judgment. 
Respectfully, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
Attorney for Appellant, Basil Vetas 
-10-
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